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2Introduction
This is a comparative study of social organization,
leadership, development and democracy in Kwamashu and Lindelani.
Specifically, the study seeks to know how it is that the
leadership in the squatter camp (informal settlement) of
Lindelani is abla to solicit funds for and create a climate
within which development projects are implemented whilst the
leadership in the township (formal settlement) of Kwamashu seems
unsuccessful at doing the same.
Kwamashu and Lindelani are adjacent areas north of Durban.
Kwamashu is a formal township and Lindelani is a squatter camp
into which Kwamashu and surrounding areas overflowed around 1983.
The curious development in the past ten years is that there has
been almost no significant basic infrastructural development in
Kwamashu while Lindelani had schools, creches, and even a
football field, amongst other things, built in its area. The
obvious question is; how is it that a squatter area can have more
basic infrastructural development than a formal area?
Normally, the prevalence of violence features as one of the
explanations for the inability (or the hesitancy) to implement
development projects and decisions. Indeed, there are numerous
reports of road construction and electrical installation
companies which have lost tools, materials and even lives while
trying to implement development projects in Kwamashu.
Another answer, which follows from the first, is that
development organizations - pressed for evidence of "successes" -
are reluctant to risk their resources in areas where they may
3lose tools, materials and endanger lives. Consequently, they
fund projects in those areas where their efforts are less likely
to be hampered; i.e. areas where they can show immediate results.
Some of the major reasons for the choice of "disciplined" areas,
are that the "project level" as opposed to the "metropolitan",
"regional" or "national level" of development burdens most -
developers with the provision of essential services (such as
peace-broking, skills training etc.) which are not be part of
their mandate.
While they may be a grain of truth in the foregoing
arguments, they, however, still beg the question; why is it that
disturbances which hamper development and discourage development
organizations occur more in Kwamashu and not so much in
Lindelani?
Another somewhat different argument used to explain the
"successes" of Lindelani over Kwamashu is the relationship
between leaders in Lindelani and officials in the Kwazulu
administration. This relationship is said to favour the
extension of services towards Lindelani and away from Kwamashu.
While this study recognises the positive effect on development
owing to the relationship between the type of leadership in
Lindelani and its ties to the Kwazulu administration or,
conversely, the negative effect owing to the relationship between
the contested leadership in Kwamashu and its relations with the
Kwazulu administration, it argues that it is the peculiarity of
the Kwamashu leadership, more than the effect of ties to the
Kwazulu administration, which creates an environment within which
those implementing development projects are harassed and
4attacked.1
In making that claim, this study argues for a relationship
between the type of authority and prospects for development. To
help us conceptualise relations within these two areas, it is
important to review briefly what some students of power,
authority and development, have said on these issues. Towards
this purpose, we. shall commence with investigating relations
within constitutions presided over by individuals and then
relations within constitutions presided over by groups of people.
On the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
First, as will be clear later, most relevant, for our
purposes of looking at constitutions presided over by
individuals, is Socrates's analysis of the origins, methods and
effects of tyranny.
According to Plato, in his description of different
"constitutions", Socrates explains why one form of "constitution"
emerges and why it falls. He claims that tyranny originates from
"too much democracy". A democracy, he maintains, is a government
where "all are set free to do as they wish ... to go to the devil
in their own way"2. This state of things, however, does not last
long. People get tired of "the lawlessness of liberty which has
become licence". They then gather together and appoint a "strong
man to restore order". The strong man then brings together -
'. It is beyond the scope of this study to analyze the
partial effects of each of the independent variables. Such an
analysis has to await a more statistical enguiry.
2
. This and other statement attributed to Socrates are
found in Book VIII of Plato's The Republic.
5with people's approval - "bodyguards or a private army" with the
purpose of eradicating lawlessness in society. Without people's
awareness a tyranny gets established!
Nevertheless, reigning over a tyranny is not bed of roses;
"the tyrannic man ... is a slave to fear, want, every sort of
misery and every sort of wickedness". The tyrant is ever
concerned about possible coups and assassinations. This makes
some tyrants - the wise ones - moderate their reign with
behaviour akin to "kingship", in the Aristotelian sense.
Aristotle describes "kingship" or "monarchy" as the
government of that person who governs in the interests of all.
He considers this as the best form of government.3 A tyrant, on
the other hand, governs in his own interests. In his words,
tyranny is exercised as a "mastership" over slaves. He
concludes, "It is clear then that those constitutions which aim
at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute
justice; while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are
wrong".
The need for longevity leads to the need to temper the
character of their rule which, in turn, leads tyrants to engage
in projects which benefit the people ("common good") or, at
least, some of them.
Second, most relevant for constitutions presided over by
groups of people is Aristotle's description of oligarchy.
According to Aristotle, oligarchy "occurs when the sovereign
power of the constitution is in the hands of those with
3
. All statements attributed to Aristotle are excerpted
from Aristotle's The Politics.
6possessions". It is, in effect, a degenerated aristocracy; that
is, when the government of the "men of wisdom" governing for the
best interests of the state is over-ridden by those whose
interests is amassing wealth for themselves..
Like tyranny, oligarchy seldom occurs in a pure type. It
almost always exists in some form as a combination of the
Aristotelian oligarchy and aristocracy - depending on the level
of "wisdom" of those in power. This also creates potential for
overtures to the masses of people or a segment thereof. It is
under these conditions that we can consider a possibility of
"development" initiatives from both oligarchs and tyrants.
However development itself has a logic which affects or is
affected by the form of government under which it occurs.
The Type of Regime and Political Participation in Development
The relationship between the type of regime and political
participation is best represented in the debate over the
bureaucratic-authoritarian model. The bureaucratic-
authoritarian model emerged in the analysis of the relationship
between the level of development and the type of governments
among Latin American states. At the center of this enquiry was
the validity of the hypothesis which posits a positive
relationship between democracy and development. It seemed, at
the time, as though the type of dependent development in which
Latin American countries were engaged had produced the "collapse"
of the type of development which depended on the "popular
sector". Trade unions, and civic organizations were side-lined
as the elites - together with the favoured classes - were brought
7to the center to direct, and enjoy the fruits of, development.
A better road-map of the types and nature of states which
emerged in Latin America around this time is provided by the
Argentine Guillermo O'Donnell. Primary in O'Donnell's enquiry
is whether the political structure is "incorporating" or
"excluding"; that is, whether the "popular sector" is activated
to participate or consulted for inputs in decision-making. In
his analysis, he notices frequently occurring "constellation"
(types of governments, coalitions and policies) among Latin
American states. He notices three types of "constellations";
oligarchic, populist and bureaucratic-authoritarian.1 Before we
enumerate these "constellations", we should hasten to mention
that our concern here is mostly on the level of political
participation within them.
The oligarchic structures are governed by the elites for
themselves; government policy is aimed at satisfying the will and
needs of the elites. Normally, in such states, the majority of
the people are in rural areas and are not yet activated
politically. Hence, such states are neither "incorporating" nor
"excluding".
The populist structure is normally based on multi-class
coalition of the urban politicians, elites and working class.
4
. Please see the English version of Guillermo O'Donnell's
"Reflexiones sobre las tendencias generales de cambio en el
Estado burocratico-autoritario" in The Latin American Research
Review 13, No.l (1978). See also David Collier's "Overview of
the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model" and Albert O. Hirschman's
"The turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the Search for
its Economic determinants" in Collier's The New Authoritarianism
in Latin America
8The state pursues policies which lead to the rise in wages, are
not oppressive to unions, and are generally supportive of the
domestic market. Populist structures, however, should not be
confused with democratic structures, for some structures which
are initially populist and democratic turn around and stifle
democracy when democracy stands in the way of dominant groups
within the coalition.
The third and last structure is the bureaucratic-
authoritarian regime. This structure is dominated by military
and civilian technocrats who are in coalition with foreign
capital. As such, the policies which are followed are those
which give access to foreign capital investment and repatriation
of profits. This is the structure which O'Donnell considers
emphatically "excluding" and non-democratic.
The structures which are important, for the purposes of this
paper, are the oligarchic and the populist structures. The
oligarchic is important because of the tendency for politics of
leadership generally and in African areas, particularly.
Although the structures investigated in this study are not in
rural areas, they have a tendency not to activate popular
participation in politics. When they do (i.e. when they become
populist) they often activate only those segments whose political
views are not antithetical to theirs. Often the activation of
a group is so that the activated group is used against those
groups whose views are inimical to those of the leaders.
Except for the fact that O'Donnell restricts oligarchy to
an agrarian economy, his oligarchy looks very similar to those
described by both Socrates and Aristotle. In his definition of
9oligarchy, O'Donnell emphasises the fact that the rulers are the
elites who are concerned with international trade of agricultural
products. Socrates, for his part, described oligarchic people
as "money-grubbers". He sees the oligarchic person as driven by
"pleasure-loving" coupled with "ungenerosity". In the oligarchic
person, "the desiring part prevails over the reasoning and
spirited parts". And Aristotle views oligarchy as in existence
when the "sovereign power of the constitution is in the hands of
those with possessions".
Unlike O'Donnell's oligarchy, however, Socrates's and
Aristotle's oligarchies arise out of the degeneration of "good
government". Socrates sees oligarchy as the degeneration of
timocratic (the honour-loving) government which, itself is a
degeneration of aristocratic (wisdom-loving) government. And
Aristotle's oligarchy is a degenerated aristocracy (the
government of the best men ruling for the best interest of
all).
Despite Socrates and Aristotle, experience has shown that
there is no one route for the emergence of oligarchy.
Oligarchies have arisen out of different situations. Also, as
we have said before, oligarchic structures do not occur in the
pure types described by Socrates and Aristotle. They normally
combine characteristics of two or more forms of government. This
is largely due to the dictates of the social climate in which
they exist.
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Case Studies
1. Kwamashu
The first residents of Kwamashu arrived from Cato Manor,
into a not yet completely built township, in 1958. The township
was being built by the Durban City Corporation (Corporation) as
a domicile for Africans who were working in Durban. Because the
Africans were not allowed to buy the houses they moved into, and
many of them could not afford it anyway, the maintenance for the
township was left in the hands of the Corporation.
From the early 1960s to 1975, the maintenance and provision
of infrastructure and facilities was in the hands of the
Corporation. Such services included the maintenance of the
infrastructure such as the water and sewerage system, the
maintenance of buildings such as the repainting and replacement
of walls and doors, refuse removal, the sweeping of streets, the
cutting of overgrown grass alongside the streets, and the
maintenance of roads and bridges.
The provision of facilities included the building of two
swimming pools, nine soccer fields, one tennis court, numerous
lower and higher primary schools, about three high schools, a
handful of creches and children's playgrounds.
As should be evident from their numbers, the facilities were
insufficient for the township population. Over and above that,
the services provided in these facilities were the barest minimum
necessary for the facility to keep its name. For instance,
classrooms were barely four walls with windows and a door. They
had no electricity and no heating system. Science students were
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lucky to have a beaker for science experiments. As a result
students had to believe what the books said rather than
experiment in the laboratories of their schools.
This state of things obtained well into the 1970s. In 1975,
Kwamashu was incorporated into Kwazulu. The provision of
services then became the responsibility of the Kwazulu
administration. The Kwazulu administration had less financial
resources than the Corporation. It also had a different attitude
towards housing within its jurisdiction. It allowed residents
to buy their houses. The change of ownership relieved the
administration of the responsibility to repair houses and to
maintain some of the infrastructure. Some of the services which
had been provided by the Corporation were "privatised" e.g.
refuse removal. This privatisation - which occurred without a
public discussion - benefited those who were structurally
situated (such members of the "council") to take advantage of
such functions.
The movement from one dominant provider of all the services
to a multitude of providers of ever smaller services, introduced
elements of anarchy in the provision of services. Sometimes
refuse is not removed and, when it is removed, only that which
is neatly packaged into refuse bins and plastic bags gets picked-
up. Consequently, streets are strewn with refuse overflows and
no-one seems to have a mandate to pick it up. Also, underground
water and sewerage pipes frequently burst and it takes days and,
sometimes, weeks, to get them repaired, all the while their
contents overflow onto the streets.
Some of the services which were not privatised are not
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provided any more. The two swimming pools have not been
functional for more than ten years. The tennis courts have been
destroyed by disrepair. Rusted marry-go-rounds in the middle of
bushes bear a grim testimony for what used to be children's
playgrounds. The football fields are no longer looked after and
the area covering one of them was sold (by members of the
"council") to developers for the building of houses.
The shortage of funds has also affected the quality of
schools and, as such, the quality of education. Schools have to
raise their own funds for facilities and for extensions, such as
the building of new classes. As such, the extent to which the'
school has facilities correlates with the resourcefulness of the
principal. The differential resourcefulness of principals is
evidenced by the striking disparities in classrooms, quality of
teachers and equipment between different high schools.
Since the mid 1980s, little or no development has taken
place in Kwamashu, excerpt for sporadic development of roads and
electricity connections which are now and then disrupted by
attacks on the developers.
Township Leadership, Development and Democracy
The question then is how one accounts for the changes. At
the beginning, the administration of Kwamashu was presided over
by the Township Manager. Most of the finances were grants from
the Durban City Corporation and the rest were raised from rents
and rates. The township manager was assisted by the "council
system" which played an advisory role on community matters. The
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•
council system was supposed1 to represent the interests of the
residents. But since the Council system had no teeth - the
•
township manager dictated po'licy - residents did not rely on it
and few participated in thdir elections. This system was, in
O'Donnell's words, "excluding".
Without participation by residents, the councillors became
a clique dominated by the business interests in the township.
•
At the point of incorporation into Kwazulu, the "council system"
was given more powers to raise and collect rents and rates. It
also had power to sell vacant land for development. As such,
against the interests of! residents, they allowed "foreign"-
capital to dominate township businesses such as shops, petrol
stations, and land and real estate development. It is openly
acknowledged that some of the fancy vehicles in which some of the
councillors drive were kick-backs from such deals.
i
When Kwamashu was | incorporated into Kwazulu, most
councillors committed their areas without consultation with
residents. Such decisions (and opposition to them resulted in the
friction and violence which engulfed Kwamashu in the 1980s as
township residents demanded the right to choose their own
representatives. Out of that conflict, a civic organisation was
born, late in the 1980s. The civic claims to represent the
interests of the residents who did not want to be incorporated
into Kwazulu.
However, since the 1980s violence did not result in the
outright victory of any group, we have a situation of "dual
power" in Kwamashu; the civic and the council system. While the
civic seems to enjoy popular support, it is, however, unable to
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deliver resources since the purse is in the hands of the Kwazulu
administration which looks unfavourably to the existing civic
organization. In order to boost support for the councillors,
funds are allocated for projects that councillors propose but
such funds are not made available for projects proposed by the
civic. This climate fosters an environment within which those
invited to implement development projects are seen as taking
sides. Hence when they are'attacked, few people either defend
them or offer themselves as witnesses to such attacks.
As a result, many development projects in Kwamashu have
either been postponed or cancelled. It is no wonder therefore
that one still witnesses the unremoved scars of the 1980s
violence, such as the burned down shops and houses. Most
recreational facilities remain in disrepair and in need of major
renovations. Over and above that, the upgrading of the
infrastructure is hampered by attacks on those installing new or
extending old electricity lines and poles as well as attacks on
those improving the condition of roads.
Also, the conflict between the civic and the council system
is having a negative effect on the civic claims of operating
democratically. Since public meetings called by the civic are
either attacked or threatened with attack, people tend hot to
avail themselves for such meetings. In cases when people are
afraid to attend public meetings, it becomes difficult to
maintain that decisions taken by the civic are representative of
the wants of the population.
*
In sum, the initial administration of the Corporation was
i 1 5
able to push through its [development programs without much
consultation and discussion: The people were shut out of the
decision making process and their "representatives" - the council
system - did not have a mandate and could not alter or block the
I
wishes of the Corporation. ;
During, and after, the incorporation into Kwazulu, the
oligarchic tendencies of the1 council system began to crystallise.
The powers of the township manager's office (who, from then, was
an African) were severely curtailed to a point where the township
manager was only useful in as much as he could give technical
information and advice. While the new order pretended to be both'
populist and "incorporating", those who were "incorporated" wee
those whose views did not differ much from those of the council.
The civic and their supporters were shut out of the decision
making process.
It is not a correct impression to come away from this study
with the impression that all the councillors were, in Socrates's
words, "money-grubbers". There were some whose "aristocratic"
tendencies could have been unleashed, only if they worked under
different conditions. These, however, were the absolute
minority. The majority, indeed, had tendencies towards "money-
grubbing" . One monument to their "money-grubbing" is the
restriction and closure of the Kwanashu cemetery in order to sell
land to developers. The Kwamashu residents are now faced with
having to bury their dead either 15km away, at Molweni, or to
find a place in town; where the services are more expensive.
Regarding the prevailing conditions, however, both the
council and the civic are partly at fault. The logjam on
16
services created by the confrontation between the civic and the
council system makes one wonder whether the best strategy for a
democrat, in battle against adversaries, is to block development
- at all costs - even if that development is aimed at helping the
people one claims to represent.
It is important to.notice that the paralysis created by the
confrontation between the civic and the council system has, in
turn, created an environment within which there was no power
which dominated. Consequently, no group was powerful enough to
limit, constantly and effectively, the liberty of its nemeses.
Hence the relative freedom which was enjoyed by the Kwamashu
residents - i.e. before the March 1994 assault. (Even though
Kwamashu is reputed to be an ANC stronghold, the truth is that
many Inkatha supporters lived in Kwamashu during this time
without fear of being attacked or expelled. They, however, may
have been restricted from wearing or proselytising Inkatha
paraphernalia in certain areas.)
2. Lindelani
Lindelani is a Zulu verb meaning - to more than one person
- wait a little while. It is claimed that this was the promise
given, by the Kwazulu administration, to the people who had begun
squatting in the area then known as Emachobeni. The promise was
that of services and recognition of the community. The promise
was made to squatters who were demanding proper houses and
services. They had already claimed what they saw as vacant land
and were establishing make-shift shacks, some constructed out of
wood, some out of corrugated iron, some out of cardboard boxes
,
!
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and some out of wattle and'daub.
The birth of this new community was, however, not without
pains. Elements of the Hobbesian state of nature began to rear
their ugly heads. The scramble for a piece of land where
ownership was signified by, among other things, grass knots,
cleared areas, handkerchiefs and coloured paint, led to squabbles
over title as those who came late removed the signatures of those
who had a prior claim to land. In such contests, women became
the chief victims as men made claims over lands already bearing
women's signatures.
Also, from the beginning, before the area was electrified,,
great concern was expressed over the high rate of crime - mostly
theft of building material and building tools as well as the rape
of women living alone. Theft had got so prevalent that people
hesitated to leave their shacks without anyone looking after
them; even during the day. Women could not walk alone at night
without fear of harassment.
Added to these concerns, the community was unsettled by
rumoured threats of imminent removal by the Ntuzuma township
administration. The ground on which they had settled had been
designated for the expansion of Ntuzuma township; section A, C,
and D were to be built on it. The threat was ominous, given what
was known to be established methods of removing people who either
squatted illegally or lived on lands which had been designated
or redesignated. In fact, at one time, the police moved in to
and demolished some shacks. From then, building took place in
the evening and at night.5
See also C. Fourie's 1986 study of Lindelani.
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In the classical Hobbesian resolution of the "state of
nature", the community "conferred all thsir power and strength
upon an assembly of men" which was supposed to protect them from
one another and was supposed to protect them from invasions by
"foreign" powers.6 The community got together and chose a
committee which was to address their concerns over crime and was
to represent them in resolving the uncertainty of the status of
their area.7
The committee was indeed successful - not without some
brutal methods - in lowering the level of crime and increasing
the feeling of safety. Over time, after doing away with the
opposition, one man, Mr Thomas Mandla Shabalala, emerged within
the committee as the chief decision-maker. He consolidated his
rule in a manner which resembled an African local authority. He
had izinduna who, in turn, had their own messengers and
"community police". The community police were subdivided into
"police units" who patrol the area and some guard over the
leader's house.
Since the area was not policed officially, the community
"police units" patrolled the streets at night and "arrested"
anyone contravening the established code of conduct. The
arrested person would be brought to the leader's residence where
he or she would be tried and then sentenced. The sentence was
normally a warning or a number of lashes on the person's behind,
depending on the crime.
6
. Please see Thomas Hobbes's "Of Common-wealth" in his
Leviathan
1
. C. Fourie refers to this group as "vigilantes", p.7
I
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While more can be said about the brutality of the methods
used by the Lindelani leadership to create peace and, indeed, a
lot has been written on thisj issue8, what has been overlooked is
•
the ability of the leadership to summon development agencies into
the area and to create aj climate within which development
proceeds without interruption from residents. One -example of
such ability was the agreement between the leadership in
Lindelani and Murray and I Roberts for the construction of
buildings in the area. !
It is undeniable that the favouritism from the Kwazulu
administration plays a large role in funding and procuring
development projects and organizations; after all, Mr Shabalala
is a member of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly and a member of
Inkatha's Central Committee.9 But the Kwazulu administration
•
does not create the order| in Lindelani; this is done by the
leadership in Lindelani. i The authority of the leadership in
Lindelani is such that no one can either oppose or dare to
disturb development agencies. Such actions result in lashing,
exile and worse. ,
It is not surprising) therefore, that Lindelani has had a
rapid development of the infrastructure and provision of
services. It boasts a' tarred main road which leads to smaller
dirt roads, a creche, 1 L.P. and 1 H.P. schools, an electricity,
plumbing and building training centre, a handy-crafts centre, a
gardening course run by the Department of Manpower, 2 soccer
8
. See for instance, A de V. Minnaar's "Mafia Warlords or
Political Entrepreneurs? Warlordism in Natal", Pretoria, 1991.
'. See A. de V. Minnaar, p.9
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fields, a stadium and numerous informal playgrounds, numerous
vegetable stalls and shack shops. This is more than one can say-
about any informal area. This level of development rivals and
tops that of many of the formal townships.
Squatter Camp Leadership, Development and Democracy
While the foregoing may point to the successes of the
leadership style in Lindelani, the successes of the style have
not come without some costs. To begin with, the clamping down
which was imposed following the rise in crime also created a
climate within which dissenting voices were silenced. And, when
the leadership in Lindelani allied themselves with the, then,
Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, the area became hostile territory
to those squatters who either owed allegiance to rival political
parties or were apathetic. As a result, large migrations out of
Lindelani were witnessed. At the same time, however, there was
also migration into Lindelani by those who favoured Inkatha.
Because the remaining population had been pacified and
conveniently "incorporated" (in O'Donnell's terms), the
leadership could expect minimum opposition from the people. As
such, development projects, in the area, had to be approved by
the leadership. In most instances, such approval was based on
forms of gratuities paid to the leadership.10 A monument to the
exclusion of popular participation in discussions regarding
development projects and land-use in Lindelani is the permission
granted to some companies to use a part of Lindelani as a waste
10
. It is argued that it was a dispute over this form of
gratuity which soured the agreement between the Lindelani
leadership and Murray and Roberts.
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dump. The health and environmental consequences of that decision
are yet to be ascertained.
In any area where the leadership excludes the population at
the initial stages of any deal democracy is jeopardised. Despite
their overtures towards populism, it is not at all clear that
both Lindelani and Kwamashu forms of leadership are trustful of
j
true democracy. Normally, jpeople are invited to participate in
decisions once the leaders have demarcated the boundaries of
discussion and decision-making. It is no consolation, therefore,
to argue that, as long as the decision is beneficial to the
i
people, it does not matter by whom it is made.
Typologies in Repression
Squatter Camps: Repression and Exclusion
It is not accidental|that leadership in squatter camps, in
the recent period, hasj been characterised by repression.
Normally, people arrive in such areas with different ideas of how
to live in the new community. Some arrive with ulterior motives
of preying on others. It becomes therefore imperative that a
structure - to which most should owe allegiance - be set up.
Since, at the beginning, force becomes necessary to rid the area
of "unwanted elements", either through suppression or through
exile. It is this use1 of force which colours the form of
leadership in most squattier areas, even when the need for the use
of force has subsided." ,'
11
. Normally, the qualities called for in the leadership at
the initial stages of a isquatter settlement are not the same as
the qualities which become essential once stability has been
attained.
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While the forms of repression practised by squatter camp
leadership are severe, they become even more severe when
residents of a squatter area owe allegiance to political parties
which are at odds with one another. In most cases, political
differences are resolved - not before bloody battles - through
the exiling of the defeated supporters of one of the parties.
Force continues to dominate relations within the squatter area
well after the exiling of the defeated party. In such instances,
force becomes the method of keeping people in line.
While it may be difficult to go around or ignore some of the
most dictatorial of leaders, processes which either encourage or
compel them to function democratically should be put in place.
If we fail at this, we would not only be strengthening
undesirable forms of leadership, but we would also be failing
South Africa on the promise of "democratising the all levels of
government and forms of authority."
Township Leadership: Repression and Exclusion
In many of the townships, the "council system" is seen to
have colluded with the apartheid regime in the oppression of
residents. Such perceptions lead to the rejection of the council
system and those serving within it. Invariably, this leads to
confrontation between those in the council system and the new
leadership representing the disenchanted residents. In the past,
the councillors had the support of the state which picked up the
gauntlet in their favour. In such environments, democracy loses
out as people are forced to join one side or the other in the
conflict.
; 23
The alternative institutions themselves are born in
i
contentious environments and1, as a result, develop dictatorial
•
and repressive tendencies in order to survive assaults from the
council system and its benefactors. It is troubling to consider
the prospects for true democracy in institutions born in
environments and processes w,hich succeed by stifling democratic
•
procedures. And without democracy, how could we have development
which addresses the people's needs?
Lastly, the democratic intentions of the civic organisation
may not be sufficient to pro'duce the necessary development. The
j
civics may still need to learn the art of raising funds for
development, inviting and . enticing development agencies and
managing development programs. These processes should be free
of the increasingly encumbering and unending processes of
i
"consultation" which are staged, ostensibly, to "get the opinions
of the people" when, in fact, they are measures through which
corrupt civic leadership ' control development projects and,
subsequently, finances accruing therefrom.
Understandably, one of the major reasons for the emergence
of individuals who use development to enrich themselves is the
high unemployment in African areas. But this should not make us
tolerate processes which are stumbling blocks to development when
the demand of the provision of services is growing daily. The
success to which we are able to resolve these blockages will be
the extent to which we can deliver some of the promises of the
RDP.
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Conclusion
This study analyses the relationship between authority and
development. It argues that development has taken place in
Lindelani largely because (i) its strong leadership has the
support of the Kwazulu administration (ii) the leadership, in
order to secure its position and to appease the residents,
invites development organizations and creates a climate conducive
to the implementation of development projects (iii) save for
"informative" sessions, its processes are not encumbered by
hearings, discussions, consultation and feedbacks.
In Kwamashu, on the other hand, the logjam between the
civic and the council system has paralysed opportunities for
development and opportunities for popular participation in
development initiatives. Consequently, few and sporadic
development initiatives are attempted, mostly without the input
from the public. The conflict between the civic organisation and
the council system has made it difficult for the civic to operate
democratically, despite claims of representativeness. The threat
of possible attacks on civic public meetings dissuades people
from attending. Consequently, most people in Kwamashu do not
even know that there is a civic organisation. Most of those who
know, do not know who is in it and where and how they could get
hold of them.
We have, therefore, two ostensibly different systems which,
nonetheless, as far as democracy is concerned, have the same
results. One resembles a mix of tyranny and oligarchy and the
other is a mix of oligarchy and aristocracy. All the same, they
both have, effectively, tendencies towards exclusion despite
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their efforts at being 'incorporating, albeit, partially.
Consequently, development projects - where they occur - tend to
be geared to address the concerns of the leadership more than
those of the people. ;
Contrary to those jWho see the solution (to the
administration and development of formerly African areas) in the
"rationalisation" of administration, and fully cognisant that,
as Max Weber warns against the antidemocratic tendencies of
bureaucracy, and with ample1 evidence from the apartheid era, this
study maintains that "rationalisation" alone cannot resolve the
problem of authority and
 f development in African areas. It-
argues, instead, that the lack of representation, consultation
and accountability to the people has created an environment
within which the conception, planning and implementation of
development takes place behind people's backs. Development
projects have to be decided, planned and implemented with the
participation of the whole community if they are to address the
real needs of the people and not just those-who claim to be their
representatives, whether modern or traditional.
